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ON ST. ISAAC THE SYRIAN’S ARGUMENT AGAINST 
DIVINE RETRIBUTION
Jordan Wessling
Many theists maintain that God punishes humans retributively, whereby God 
intentionally harms those punished as their sins deserve, without also aim-
ing qua punishment to contribute to the immediate or ultimate flourishing of 
those punished, or to the flourishing of some third (human) party. By contrast, 
St. Isaac the Syrian in effect contends that such an understanding of divine 
retribution is incompatible with a plausible understanding of God’s initial 
creative purposes of love and is thus untrue. In this paper, I present and sub-
stantially build upon Isaac’s contention, and I defend the resulting developed 
argument as a good argument worthy of further consideration.
Many religious theists maintain that God punishes humans retributively. 
According to one way of understanding this teaching, God punishes indi-
viduals, with a fitting level of severity, primarily for the guilt accrued by 
past sins, and this punishment (qua punishment) need not, and regularly 
does not, aim to enhance the good or flourishing of those punished, but 
instead may be positively bad for the subjects of punishment. Christian 
theists, specifically, have often relied upon the noted understanding of 
retributive punishment to justify certain versions of the doctrine of hell 
as well as the atonement.1 Such a divine retributivist view, however, is 
neither the perspective of all religious theists in general, nor Christian the-
ists in particular. On the contrary, the repudiation of the claim that God 
exercises this kind of retribution has a long history in Christian thought.
One particularly outspoken Christian critic of the notion that God 
punishes retributively in the sense described is St. Isaac the Syrian (also 
known as St. Isaac of Nineveh). Isaac was a seventh century monk who 
remains widely respected among Eastern Christian communities (even 
among those who are otherwise splintered), but is relatively unknown in 
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1Regarding the doctrine of hell, see Adams, “Hell and the God of Justice,” 433–447, and 
Clark, “God is Great, God is Good,” 15–31. For a discussion of many of the relevant issues 
regarding the atonement, see Crisp, “Non-Penal Substitution,” 419–433.
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the Christian West today, despite the fact that he enjoyed an extensive 
readership in the West during the 13th–15th centuries.2 Given the pastoral 
and exhortative purposes of many of his writings, Isaac does not normally 
structure arguments in a rigorous and systematic fashion. Nevertheless, 
careful attention to his writings yield a handful of perceptive arguments 
against the teaching that God punishes with the relevant form of retribu-
tion. In this paper, I examine and substantially extend one of these argu-
ments, specifically one in which Isaac contends that the idea that God 
punishes humans with retribution (along the lines described) is incompat-
ible with God’s initial creative purposes of love, and is thus untrue. I label 
the resulting Isaac-inspired version of the relevant argument the Argument 
from God’s Purposes (henceforth the AGP), and I defend the AGP as a good 
argument that merits further discussion.
The development and defense of the AGP is rolled out in three main 
sections. In the first section, I lay the foundation for the AGP. This I do by 
examining one of Isaac’s arguments against divine retribution, collecting 
various conceptual resources from Isaac in the process. In gathering these 
resources from Isaac, I repeatedly supply added theses when judged nec-
essary, all the while attempting to make it clear as to when I am exposit-
ing Isaac and when I am adding my own principles.3 In this first section, 
moreover, I draw principally from a set of interlocking and sequentially 
unfolding chapters (i.e., chs. 38–40) from a compilation of Isaac’s essays 
referred to as “The Second Part.”4 Due to limitations of space, I am unable 
to situate Isaac in his historical context, nor engage the secondary litera-
ture on him, in a way that would satisfy the historian. Instead, as I unpack 
Isaac’s argument, I regularly make direct appeals to Isaac’s writings as a 
means of providing some evidence that my reading is on the right track, 
2For a succinct overview of Isaac’s ancient and contemporary influence, see Scully, Isaac of 
Nineveh’s Ascetical Eschatology, xiv–xvii.
3For the development of the AGP, I utilize what might be deemed a rational reconstruc-
tion of an argument Isaac presses against the teaching that God punishes humans with 
retribution. The “rational reconstruction” I have in mind is the project of building upon, and 
presenting in a more rigorous and contemporary way, a form of reasoning found in Isaac. 
Among other things, such a reconstruction includes taking note of explicit claims and modes 
of reasoning found in Isaac, locating and stating relevant implicit assumptions apparently 
used by Isaac, adding additional theses to what Isaac says in the effort to strengthen his 
reasoning, and integrating all of the results of these procedures into the presentation of 
an argument that is potentially helpful for those who wish to consider divine punishment 
today. At minimum, the intent is for the ensuing rational reconstruction of Isaac’s argument, 
the AGP, to be in keeping with the spirit, even if not the letter, of Isaac’s original argument.
4“The Second Part” is a collection of writings that, though lost for a time, was redis-
covered by Sebastian Brock in 1983 and published by him in translated form twelve years 
later. (For more on the finding of the second part of Isaac’s writings, see the following two 
works by Sebastian Brock: “Isaac of Ninevah” and “Lost and Found.”) This compilation is 
comprised of prayers, sermons, theological papers, and the like, and is so named because it 
constitutes the second portion of Isaac’s better known, The Ascetical Homilies of St Isaac the 
Syrian.
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even if such appeals are not demonstrative.5 In the second section of this 
article, I present and defend the AGP. The AGP is essentially a systematic 
presentation of the teachings and modes of reasoning underscored in the 
preceding section of this paper, although the manner in which I articulate 
and defend the AGP in this second section culls additional resources from 
Isaac as well as unrelated writings (contemporary and otherwise). Finally, 
in the third section, I present one salient philosophical-theological objec-
tion to the AGP, and I mine Isaac’s writings for aid in considering how one 
might attempt to rebut this objection.
I. Isaac’s Argument Against Divine Retribution
Like many contemporary Christian theologians and philosophers of reli-
gion, Isaac maintains that God’s fundamental motivation for creating and 
guiding the affairs of humans is that of love.6 In his view, “Among all 
[God’s] actions there is none which is not entirely a matter of mercy, love, 
and compassion: this constitutes the beginning and the end of His deal-
ings with us.”7 Elsewhere Isaac elaborates,
With what purpose and with what love did He create this world and bring 
it into existence! What a mystery does the coming into being of this crea-
tion look towards! To what state is (our) common nature invited! What love 
served to initiate the creation of the world! [.  .  .] In love did [God] bring 
the world into existence; in love is He going to bring it to that wondrous 
transformed state, and in love will the world be swallowed up in the great 
mystery of Him who has performed all these things; in love will the whole 
course of governance of creation be finally comprised. [. . .] With this design 
did He bring [rational beings] into existence [. . .].8
Isaac is clear. God creates and guides humanity—indeed the whole 
world—out of love.
The claim that God is motivated primarily9 by love to create and guide 
humans can be understood in two fundamental ways. It can be taken to 
5For what it is worth, many of the central features of my reading of Isaac are in step with 
recent treatments of the general contours of Isaac’s theology. See, e.g., Alfeyev, The Spiritual 
World of Isaac the Syrian, 35–48, 283–297; and Hagman, The Asceticism of Isaac of Ninevah, 
197–204.
6On Isaac’s views on creation, see Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian, 35–60.
7II/39, 22. All quotes taken from Isaac of Nineveh (Isaac the Syrian), “The Second Part,” 
Chapters IV–XLI, translated by Sebastian Brock.
8II/38, 1–2.
9It is not entirely clear to me whether Isaac means to commit himself to the notion that God 
is motivated wholly by love in creating and guiding humans, or primarily by love in these ways. 
Because little of substance turns on which Isaac prefers for the purposes of this article, I speak 
of Isaac affirming the claim that God is motivated primarily or principally by love in creating 
and guiding humans. Additionally, in this context, when I say that God is primarily or principally 
motivated by love in the noted ways, I have in mind the notion that God’s loving motive is 
lexically ordered over other concerns—that is, even if God has other concerns that do or might 
factor into His dealings with us, His love is absolutely prioritized over these other concerns. 
Isaac appears to affirm at least this much, albeit implicitly. (Thanks goes to Mark Murphy for 
suggesting a clarification along these lines on what “primarily” in this context means.)
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mean that God is motivated by love to create and guide the collection or 
whole of all humans, or these creative and providential purposes can be 
understood to concern each and every human being, individually. I sus-
pect that Isaac would want to affirm both ideas, insofar as each of these 
options is deemed an expression of divine creativity which is thereby wor-
thy of God’s affection.10 Regardless, Isaac is almost certainly committed to 
the teaching that God is deeply concerned with individual creatures, and 
that each and every human is produced and continuously providentially 
guided by divine love. For example, in the context of considering God’s 
motivation for creating, Isaac writes that God “has a single ranking of 
complete and impassible love towards everyone [i.e., every rational crea-
ture], and he has a single caring concern for those who have fallen, just 
as much as for those who have not fallen.”11 That God’s love is directed 
towards everyone, including those who have fallen and those who have 
not, indicates that Isaac understands God’s loving care to extend to each 
individual human, and not that which is reducible to a love for some set 
or group of humans. Indeed, God provides for “all created things in His 
immeasurable compassion,” and, echoing the language of Luke 15:7, Isaac 
claims that the Heavens rejoice “at a single sinner who repents,” whether 
that sinner be a human or even a demon.12
As Isaac sees it, the God who is primarily motivated by love in His 
dealings with humans would not entertain the idea of punishing humans 
retributively. In fact, it is “abominable” to “suppose that retribution for 
evil acts is to be found in [God].”13 What, precisely, Isaac means by “ret-
ribution” is not something that he spells out entirely, however. But the 
way in which Isaac speaks of retribution reveals that he has in mind that 
which is relevantly similar to the rather strong characterization of retrib-
utive punishment that began this article. As shall become clear, Isaac spe-
cifically objects to the idea that God punishes (and hence harms, in some 
sense) individuals primarily for the guilt accrued by past sins in a manner 
which is not also aimed towards the good of those punished.14
Isaac, so far as I know, never considers the option that love might drive 
God to punish some humans in ways that are positively bad for them, but 
good for others. He never entertains the idea that, say, God might punish 
the guilty principally to keep them from hurting the innocent, to deter 
others from committing self-harming evils, or to communicate to victims 
that their victimization will not be tolerated (again, as far as I am aware). 
Instead, Isaac appears to assume that God need not choose between love 
of the guilty and love of the innocent in His punitive acts. The assump-
tion, though substantive, is not an implausible one. Given omniscience, 
God probably can figure out ways to punish that are beneficial, or may 
10See, e.g., II/10, 18–19, 24; II/38, 1–3.
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in principle be beneficial, to all of those who are pertinently impacted.15 
Whatever the case, the relevant argument from Isaac is not directed 
against those who say that God must punitively harm some exclusively 
or primarily for the sake of others. Rather, Isaac aims to demonstrate the 
falsity of the teaching that God punishes humans retributively in the sense 
just described. But almost certainly, Isaac would also object to the idea that 
God punitively harms the guilty solely or primarily for the sake of the 
innocent. Thus, in order to give Isaac’s form of reasoning a broader reach, 
we shall extend Isaac’s objection to retribution to include those who might 
modify the doctrine of divine retribution along the noted zero-sum lines.
With all that in mind, and in the attempt to unearth and expand upon 
some of the key ideas to which Isaac objects, we might understand the 
kind of retribution with which Isaac takes issue to be relevantly similar to 
“strong-retribution.”
Strong-retribution: A form of punishment (i) that aims to punish, with 
the fitting level of severity, those who deserve it on account of their past 
misconduct, principally because they deserve it, (ii) that does not aim 
intrinsically, qua punishment, to promote the flourishing of those pun-
ished (e.g., by helping them reform), and (iii) that it is not performed 
principally because it is likely to bring about the immediate or ulti-
mate flourishing of the one punished or the flourishing of some third 
(human) party.16
In what follows, I speak of God visiting or inflicting (and similar terms) 
strong-retribution on some individual when God is presented as pun-
ishing that individual in a manner that meets the specifications found 
in strong-retribution. For ease of expression, moreover, unless otherwise 
indicated I write in the remainder of this article as if all of Isaac’s uses of 
“retribution” and like terms refer to “strong-retribution” (although, again, 
Isaac nowhere states and objects to such a precise principle; at most what 
may be said is that the rejection of such a principle is entailed by the vari-
ous claims that Isaac affirms). So configured, Isaac’s contention (in effect) 
is that God does not inflict strong-retribution on humans (or any rational 
creature, for that matter).
We should not suppose that God visits strong-retribution on humans, 
Isaac maintains, since the infliction of this punishment would be incom-
patible with God’s love of those humans punished in this manner. For 
were God to inflict strong-retribution on some human, He would be 
administering a primarily “backward-looking” form of punishment (i.e., 
15Relevant here is my “How Does a Loving God Punish?” as well as my “A Love that 
Speaks in Harsh Tones.”
16This third condition is added to account for the perspective that retribution is morally 
justified on account of past wrongdoing, but that one should typically exercise retribution 
only when it is likely to have some positive outcome in the life of the one punished or in 
another’s life, even when such retribution is not intrinsically directed towards these positive 
outcomes.
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punishment based upon the guilt accrued through past failings, and 
not on what might benefit this or some other human). But such a form 
of punishment would not be taking into account the “forward-looking” 
goals of love, which aim to promote the flourishing of those loved. Isaac 
explains, here using “requital” as a synonym for “retribution,”17 specifi-
cally strong-retribution:
So then, let us not attribute to God’s actions and His dealings with us any 
idea of requital. Rather, we should speak of fatherly provision, a wise dispen-
sation, a perfect will which is concerned with our good, and complete love. 
If it is a case of love, then it is not one of requital; and if it is a case of requital, 
then it is not one of love. Love, when it operates, is not concerned with the 
requiting of former things [. . .]; rather, it looks to what is most advantageous 
in the future: it examines what is to come, and not things that are past.18
In another place, Isaac submits that divine punishment, being an expres-
sion of love, is specifically directed towards the correction and reforma-
tion of the guilty.
God chastises with love, not for the sake of revenge—far be it!—but in seek-
ing to make whole His image. And [God] does not harbor wrath until such 
time as correction is no longer possible, for He does not seek vengeance for 
Himself. This is the aim of love. Love’s chastisement is for correction, but 
does not aim at retribution.19
So, were God to inflict strong-retribution on some human, this would be 
incompatible with divine love because the former unlike the latter does 
not include the goal of promoting (or at least not substantially diminish-
ing) the flourishing of the one punished.
To dig a bit deeper into the nature of this ostensible incompatibility, the 
tension that Isaac identifies between God’s love and the supposition that 
God visits strong-retribution on persons appears to rest upon what I shall 
call “intentional-harm.”
Intentional-harm. One performs an act, A, that amounts to an instance 
of intentional-harm of some person,20 P, if the following conditions are 
jointly fulfilled: (i) A  causes P to suffer, or otherwise diminishes P’s 
flourishing; (ii) A is performed in order to cause P to suffer or other-
wise to diminish P’s flourishing, primarily because P’s suffering or the 
diminishment of P’s flourishing is deemed to be deserved, intrinsically 
valuable, and/or found pleasurable by the one inflicting A on P; and, 
finally, (iii) A  is not intrinsically directed towards contributing to P’s 
17See, II/39, 16.
18II/39, 17.
19I/48 (230) = PR 45 (323). Cited in Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian, 40–41. 
Elsewhere Isaac eschews the notion that divine punishment is “brought about in order to 
requite past actions”; rather, “all” of God’s punishments are “for the sake of the subsequent 
gain to be gotten in them [i.e., those punished]” (II/39, 15).
20For convenience, I here limit the discussion to the intentional-harm of persons, rather 
than, say, sentient beings more generally.
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immediate or ultimate flourishing or to the flourishing of some third 
(human) party, nor is A performed principally because A  is likely to 
bring about P’s immediate or ultimate flourishing or the flourishing of 
some third (human) party.
Isaac certainly does not explicitly state or argue against any thesis that 
is quite like intentional-harm. Nevertheless, I postulate intentional-harm 
as that which contains a network of ideas that undoubtedly would be 
opposed by Isaac, and which undergirds the kind of teaching on divine 
punishment to which Isaac objects.21 As with strong-retribution, I  will 
speak of God visiting or inflicting intentional-harm (and like locutions) on 
some individual if God, according to the description at issue, treats that 
individual in a manner that satisfies the conditions embedded in inten-
tional-harm. Additionally, I subsequently write as if Isaac directly objects 
to intentional-harm, even though Isaac nowhere contends with such a 
developed thesis on harming individuals.
Suppose God inflicts strong-retribution on some human. Given the pro-
vided characterization of intentional-harm, plus the plausible assumption 
that God’s visitation of strong-retribution on someone includes God’s suc-
cessfully acting in order to cause that individual to suffer or to diminish 
that individual’s flourishing (minimally, by removing some relevant good 
from that person), it follows that inflicting strong-retribution on a human 
includes inflicting intentional-harm on that individual. For once it is agreed 
that divine instances of strong-retribution include God intentionally harm-
ing persons—by intentionally causing them to suffer or by diminishing 
their flourishing, primarily because it is deserved and not also principally 
to bring about the noted forward-looking benefits—God is envisioned as 
harming persons in a manner that amounts to intentional-harm. However, 
as Isaac would have us see it, God’s inflicting of intentional-harm on some 
person contradicts God’s love for that individual. This is because loving 
someone entails promoting that individual’s highest available good or type 
of flourishing (“what is most advantageous”),22 when the opportunity to do 
so feasibly arises, and, crucially, not visiting intentional-harm on the beloved 
individual. Hence, if God punishes someone whom He loves in a manner 
that amounts to intentional-harm, as God would be via strong-retribution, 
God would be punishing that individual in opposition to His love for her.23
But why think that God would not occasionally punish in opposi-
tion to His love, especially given the weight of human sin? As intimated 
already, one significant answer by Isaac to such a question has to do with 
his conception of why God choose to create, and consequently govern, 
humans in the first place. Specifically, if God, before humans ever existed, 
21In various places, for instance, Isaac reasons against claims to the effect that God is in 
the business of “bringing us to perdition and disaster” on behalf of the conclusion that God 
punishes for the benefit of those punished (II/39, 15).
22II/39, 17.
23See, e.g., II/39, 2–7, 15–21.
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was principally motivated by love in His decision to create and providen-
tially guide humans, then God would not be driven off His predetermined 
course of love in His punishments—as would be the case were God to 
inflict strong-retribution on sinful humans.
Isaac offers a number of reasons on behalf of the inference from God’s 
initial loving motivation for creating and guiding humans to the exclusion 
of God inflicting strong-retribution. Here we focus our attention on just one 
primary justification that Isaac offers for this inference, namely, that which 
comes from God’s omniscience and the perfect practical rationality, or means-
end reasoning, derived therefrom. Considering the following example:
It is not (the way of) the compassionate Maker to create rational beings in 
order to deliver them over mercilessly to unending affliction (in punishment) 
for things of which He knew even before they were fashioned, (aware) how 
they would turn out when He created them—and whom (nonetheless) He 
created. [. . .] Such action does not belong to the Creator who, even before 
the cycle of the depiction of the universe has been portrayed, knew of all 
that was before and all that was after in connection with the actions and 
intentions of rational beings.24
In the passage cited, Isaac refers to and rejects the notion that God pun-
ishes without end in hell. However, Isaac elsewhere uses similar reasoning 
to indicate, in effect, that God would not inflict any form of strong-retribu-
tion on a person.25 For example, in speaking generally about divine retri-
bution, Isaac contends that we cannot “believe of God that He would have 
done something out of retribution for anticipated evil acts in connection 
with those whose nature He has brought into being with honour and great 
love.” 26 Similarly, in another place, Isaac says that “God’s caring is guid-
ing us all the time to what He wishes for us,” namely our “future good,” 
even “cunningly” and covertly using His foreknowledge to arrange the 
harms that befall us “for our advantage.”27 And since God created every 
human in love, even while knowing they would turn astray, it would be a 
“childish view of the Creator” to suppose that “after what He had estab-
lished had become corrupted against His will [by human sin], He devised 
some other plan, preparing ills in return for its corruption. Such are the 
feeble ways of understanding the Creator!”28
Behind these instances of reasoning resides the supposition that when 
God decided to create and guide humans, He did so while foreknowing 
all facts concerning human wrongdoing. And yet, God’s decision to cre-
ate and guide humans was principally motivated by love. However, Isaac 
believes it would be absurd for God to decide, primarily motivated by 
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love, to create and guide humans, only to abandon that loving decision 
once humans misbehave as He knew they would when He originally 
formed said loving decision. Such a conflict of purposes “characterizes 
people who do not know or who are unaware of what they are doing,”29 
but not the omniscient God who, “with a love that cannot be measured,” 
established the world, and each human within it.30
Clearly, Isaac’s argument rests upon the fundamental claim that God’s 
motivation for creating and guiding humans is love, a motivation that 
has tangible implications for how God deals with humans when they sin. 
Though Isaac never unpacks in detail what it means to be motivated by 
love to create humans, here the love is perhaps best viewed as anticipa-
tory. Since humans do not exist prior to God’s choice to create, God creates 
humans for the sake of love, that is, so that humans might flourish and ulti-
mately have the joy of being united to God in love.31 This, or some doctrine 
relevantly similar to this, is why God creates humans, according to Isaac.
On a reasonable reconstruction of Isaac’s thinking, then, God’s creating 
each human primarily for the sake of love ensures that God never visits 
intentional-harm on any human. Such intentional-harm is incompatible 
with God’s creative and providential purposes, and, for reasons that shall 
be discussed in the next two sections, Isaac maintains that there is nothing 
about the divine character that demands inflicting intentional-harm on sin-
ful humans. On the contrary, Isaac assumes that God possesses the inge-
nuity and motivation to punish humans in benevolent, remedial ways.32
With something like these assumptions in place, Isaac attempts to 
demonstrate that God’s loving motivations regarding creation preclude 
God from visiting strong-retribution on individuals. For when God con-
siders whether or not to create humans, and for what reasons He might do 
so, He does this with all facts before Him, including all foreknown facts 
relevant to human sin. Yet, despite foreknowing the depth of human sin 
prior to His choice to create, God decides to create humans principally for 
the sake of love, together with the intention to promote and act consist-
ently with each human’s flourishing whenever doing so is feasible.33 But 
since it is always feasible for God not to punish humans with strong-retri-
bution, God never punishes in this manner. Quite the opposite, God pun-
ishes only when the loving aim of correction is included.
29II/39, 6.
30II/10, 19.
31See, in particular, II/38, 1–2; cf. 1/71 (345–346) = PR 74 (509–510); II/5, 8; Gnostic Chapters 
IV, 78. More specifically, Isaac envisions a kind of deified union between God and creature, 
where the human grows to resemble God and participate in His life. Unfortunately, we cannot 
discuss Isaac’s thinking on this matter. However, see the listed references for some of Isaac’s 
thinking on this topic as well as Alfeyev’s The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian, 56–60.
32E.g., II/39, 17–22.
33Throughout this article, descriptions of God knowing or doing something prior to some 
event should be understood in terms of logical or explanatory priority; such descriptions are 
not intended to indicate (or deny) that God is temporal or “in” time.
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Of course, Isaac is aware that certain biblical passages, specifically in 
the Old Testament, seem to depict God as one who inflicts strong-retribu-
tion on humans. But Isaac insists that such passages must be interpreted in 
light of the loving character of Christ, which Isaac affirms as incompatible 
with strong-retribution. “Tell me,” Isaac asks rhetorically, “if God is some-
one who requites (evil), and He does what He does by means of requital, 
what commensurate requital do you see here [in Christ], O man? Show 
me.”34 No, Christ reveals God to be a Benevolent Father who, though mys-
terious and fearsome in certain respects, always punishes as a redemptive 
“Life-giver.”35 Unfortunately, Isaac does not engage in the kind of detailed 
biblical exegesis of this issue for which one might hope.
Isaac follows his reasoning to its perceived natural end. If God does not 
execute strong-retribution on humans, but always punishes with the goal of 
correcting and redeeming sinners, then punishment in hell similarly must 
be ordered towards redemption. This is a conclusion which Isaac embraces, 
envisioning hell as purgatorial. There sinners are chastised in love (“scourged 
by the scourge of love”)36 so that hell’s inhabitants “will be perfected in love 
for Him” and thereby “partake of the divine outpouring which the blessed 
Creator is preparing in His grace.”37 In fact, Isaac takes things a step further 
and affirms universalism, the doctrine that all will eventually be saved.38 The 
“all” here refers to every rational creature, “not even the immense wicked-
ness of the demons can overcome the measure of God’s goodness.”39
Note, however, that a broadly remedial view of divine punishment 
does not obviously require universal salvation. Against a definitively uni-
versalist outcome, for instance, many have argued that if, in love, God has 
granted creatures a measure of (libertarian) freedom that He will not over-
ride, then it is possible that some will simply choose to cling to their sins, 
and thereby forever frustrate God’s saving purposes for them.40 If such an 
option is viable, then one can maintain with Isaac that divine punishment 
is partially or wholly comprised of remedial aims without also commit-
ting oneself to the controversial doctrine of universalism.
The focus of this article, however, is not with an examination of divine 
punishment and things to come per se, but with the Isaac-inspired 
AGP, directed against the notion that God inflicts strong-retribution 
34II/39, 15; cf. II/39, 19–23.
35II/39, 23.
36I/28 (141) = PR 27 (201–202). Quote taken from Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the 
Syrian, 281.
37II/40, 4.
38Minimally, many commentators on Isaac understand him to affirm universal salvation. 
See: Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian, 283–302; Hagman, The Asceticism of Isaac of 
Ninevah, 197–212; Hryniewicz, “Universalism of Salvation,” 139–150; Ramelli, The Christian 
Doctrine of Apokatastasis, 758–766; and Ware, “Dare We Hope for the Salvation of All?,” 193–216.
39Here Isaac quotes, with approval, “the blessed” Bishop of Tarsus, Diodore (II/39, 13).
40The following works are here relevant: Buckareff and Plug, “Escaping Hell,” 39–54; 
Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell, ch. 4; Ragland, “Love and Damnation,” 206–224.
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on humans. We shall therefore leave the discussion about universalism 
aside, and focus instead on the logically separable AGP, which amounts 
to something like a more formal and systematic presentation of the ideas 
thus far canvassed.
II. The AGP
We are now in a position to consider the AGP. Relying upon the aforemen-
tioned notions of intentional-harm and strong-retribution, the argument 
may be stated as follows.
 (1) God’s primary motivation for creating and guiding each human 
is love despite foreknowing all facts about human sin prior to this 
choice to create.
 (2)  If God’s primary motivation for creating and guiding each human 
is love despite foreknowing all facts about human sin prior to this 
choice to create, then God never inflicts intentional-harm on any 
human.
 (3)  If God never inflicts intentional-harm on any human, then God 
never punishes humans with strong-retribution.
Therefore,
 (4) God never punishes humans with strong-retribution.
If the AGP is sound, in the spirit of Isaac we may uphold a general teaching 
about divine punishment, specifically, that God does not inflict strong-ret-
ribution on any human at any time. There is, moreover, a good case to be 
made that each of the premises of the AGP can be reasonably affirmed. We 
shall examine these premises in order.
The first premise, (1), is comprised of two theological theses. One of these 
is that God foreknows all facts about human sin prior to His decision to 
create. Recall, for Isaac, the importance of this theological thesis is to plant 
within his readers’ minds the notion that God’s creation of humans primarily 
for the sake of love was done with eyes wide open to the horrors of human 
evil, including the evil He would or could punish. This focus on God’s fore-
knowledge, in turn, sets the stage for reason to think that God would not first 
create humans primarily for the sake of love, only to adopt an additional and 
opposing motivational structure once humans sin as God knew they would.
Understandably, Isaac does not discuss the nature of this divine knowl-
edge with the level of precision and detail that has become customary 
within the contemporary philosophical literature on divine foreknowledge. 
It is fairly clear that Isaac simply assumes the now controversial claims that 
God can foreknow future contingents, and, also, that God can obtain this 
information prior to His decision to create.41 However, the relevant theolog-
ical thesis within (1) does not require one to maintain that God foreknows 
41Relevant here is Sanders, The God Who Risks, 205–217; and Zimmerman, “The Providential 
Usefulness of ‘Simple Foreknowledge,’” 174–196.
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future creational contingents in this manner. Instead, one could perhaps 
hold that God knows, prior to the decision to create, all possibilities—and 
where available probabilities—regarding human evil, and yet God still 
decides, principally motivative by love, to create and providentially govern 
humans. Such an understanding of divine knowledge would be consistent 
with open theism and the position sometimes called “simple foreknowl-
edge,” and it provides a viable (even if contestable) interpretation of the 
claim found within (1) that God foreknows all facts about human sin prior to 
His choice to create humans.42 In order to circumvent gratuitous objections 
to the AGP based upon divine foreknowledge, we shall keep in mind for the 
remainder of this essay the number of ways in which the thesis within (1) 
pertaining to divine foreknowledge can be interpreted.
The second theological thesis embedded within (1) is that God’s 
primary motivation for creating and providentially guiding humans 
is love. Isaac likely inherited this conviction from the Syriac Christian 
theological tradition in which he stands, a tradition that places an 
emphasis on divine love.43 But, of course, many Christian traditions 
place a premium on God’s love, and it is not the case that only Syrian 
Christians are inclined to believe that love is God’s primary motiva-
tion for creating and providentially guiding humans. On the contrary, 
many Christian theologians and philosophers, both past and present, 
explicitly affirm this theological thesis. In addition, the Syriac Christian 
tradition is not the only probable influence on Isaac’s thinking on God’s 
principle motivational stance concerning creation. The loving ministry 
of God-in-Christ looms large in Isaac’s thought, and informs the way in 
which Isaac sees God.44 It is plausible that Isaac implicitly deems God’s 
love in Christ as providing more support (albeit indirect) for the thesis 
that God’s dealings with creation are primarily motivated by love than 
it does any viable competing hypothesis.45 Whether or not Isaac reasons 
in precisely this way, I have defended something close to this reasoning 
elsewhere.46 Interested readers are directed to that defense should they 
be skeptical of it. Apart from that defense, this second theological thesis 
of (1) has been ably defended by several contemporary theologians and 
philosophers.47 Based upon such forms of argumentation, many will 
conclude that this second theological thesis within (1) is more plausible 
42This interpretation is especially plausible if one holds that the only relevant facts prior 
to God’s choice to create concern possibilities, and perhaps probabilities, about what humans 
might freely do—i.e., at that logical moment, there are no facts (yet) about what exactly 
humans freely will do or would do in discrete circumstances.
43See, Brock, “St. Isaac of Nineveh and Syriac Spirituality,” 84.
44For a summary, see Alfeyev, The Spiritual World of Isaac the Syrian, 49–60, as well as Unger, 
“The Love of God the Primary Reason for the Incarnation According to Isaac of Nineveh.” Cf. 
Isaac’s II/39, 15–16; II/40, 12.
45See, especially, Isaac’s Gnostic Chapters, IV, 78.
46Wessling, Love Divine, 76–113 and 200–206.
47For a representative sample, see Bulgakov, The Lamb of God, 119–130; Kvanvig, The 
Problem of Hell, 112–119; Moltmann, God in Creation, 73–76.
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than its denial. And, while this second theological thesis certainly has its 
detractors, with Isaac we shall assume the truth of it in what follows.48
So, given the apparent plausibility of the two theological theses of (1), 
let us proceed on the assumption that (1) is true. But (2) is quite plausi-
ble once (1) is granted. (Recall that (2) is the following premise: if God’s 
primary motivation for creating and guiding each human is love despite 
foreknowing all facts about human sin prior to this choice to create, then 
God never inflicts intentional-harm on any human.) For suppose, as found 
within (1), that God, with eyes wide open to the depth and expanse of 
human sinfulness that would (or possibly/plausibly would) transpire, cre-
ates humans for the primary purpose of loving them and guiding them in 
accordance with that love. Such a divine motivation for creating humans, 
we here assume with Isaac and with a great measure of independent plau-
sibility, entails that God sets as His primary purpose concerning humans 
the aim of bringing about the flourishing and (ultimately) the highest 
good of each human (namely, loving union with Himself). If this is so, 
it seems fairly natural to presume that God is committed never to inflict 
intentional-harm on a human. In other words, it seems that God simply 
would not opt for a course of action that contravenes His initial loving 
purposes for creation, as would be the case were God to inflict intention-
al-harm on some human, given that He selected these purposes when He 
had all requisite knowledge before Him to avoid such colliding aims.
Drawing from what Joseph Raz calls exclusionary reasons provides 
another way of thinking about (2).49 Exclusionary reasons are second-or-
der reasons that exclude certain first-order reasons to act; they are, in other 
words, second-order reasons that dictate that certain first-order reasons 
should not factor at all into one’s decision to perform some action. For 
instance, commands from an appropriate authority regularly provide rea-
sons for specific actions that exclude opposing reasons derived from mere 
personal preference. Because a sergeant in the armed forces commands 
a private to rise for training early in the morning, the private has a sec-
ond-order reason not to act on her (reasons-generating) desire to catch a 
bit of extra sleep. Promises provide another example. If Gary promises 
Allison that he will pick her up from the airport on Friday, he generates 
for himself a second-order reason totally to disregard whatever minor 
excuses he might find not to pick up Allison that Friday (e.g., he would 
rather watch television or enjoy a leisurely meal). Finally, it is plausible 
that standing in certain relationships or fulfilling particular roles to others 
can generate a consistent set of exclusionary reasons as well. Standing in 
the relationship of being the parent of or being the caretaker of young children, 
for example, often generates a pattern of second-order reasons to ignore 
48By far, the most powerful criticism of which I am aware of (1)’s second theological thesis 
is found in Jonathan Edwards’s The Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the 
World. See my Love Divine, 76–113, for some of my objections to Edwards’s views on this matter.
49See, Practical Reason and Norms.
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one’s own inclinations and preferences that run contrary to the safety and 
wellbeing of the relevant children. Sometimes these exclusionary reasons 
can be experienced as burdensome, but they need not be. It is relatively 
easy to imagine a perfect parent who loves his children so deeply that 
the exclusionary reasons related to the care of his children are internal 
to his love and not experienced as an external imposition, at least not 
routinely so.
The obvious differences aside, God’s creation of each human for the 
sake of love can be viewed as analogous to fulfilling the role of parent 
to all humanity. In the very act of creating humans for the sake of love, 
that is, God generates for Himself a pattern of second-order reasons 
for protecting and promoting the flourishing of each human—which, if 
not driven off course, eventuates in union with Himself—that excludes 
certain first-order reasons for action that would otherwise compete. 
Such exclusionary reasons would not be burdensome on God. On the 
contrary, from a perspective similar to that of Isaac’s, God is unambig-
uously and steadfastly committed to His choice to create humans for 
the sake of love, a choice made with full awareness of the sins humans 
would (or might) perpetrate. All the same, God’s loving motivation 
for creating and guiding humans sets certain parameters on how He 
will subsequently evaluate reasons for acting within creation. He now 
has exclusionary reasons not to act on certain kinds of reasons that are 
opposed to a human’s flourishing. Minimally, God has exclusionary rea-
son not to act on reasons that would amount to visiting intentional-harm 
on one or more humans.
It should be clear, then, how Raz’s exclusionary reasons can be used to 
inform (2). Should God decide to create and guide humans primarily for 
the sake of love, despite knowing the depth and scope of human sinfulness 
prior to this decision, then God, by the very nature of the case, has exclu-
sionary reason not to act on reasons that entail inflicting intentional-harm 
on any human. Of course, God’s having such an exclusionary reason does 
not imply that He would not sometimes cause or allow humans to suffer. 
What (2) implies when read in light of Raz’s idea of exclusionary reasons 
is that God would not act on any reasons He might have to visit intention-
al-harm on humans. But refusing to act on such reasons does not preclude 
God from causing a human to suffer in order to benefit her or another, for 
example.
Here is another way of getting at the main ideas behind (2). Jonathan 
Edwards refers to a chief end for which God creates humans (and the world 
more generally).50 Such an end constitutes the most significant reason for 
which God creates humans, and this end is supposed to inform and order 
all other divine goals vis-à-vis humans. Minimally, all actions that God 
performs concerning humans are supposed to realize the chief end in 
some way, and no divine action concerning humans should contradict or 
50Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World.
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otherwise thwart the achievement of God’s chief end. (2) can be seen to 
refer to a kind of chief end, only the kind of chief end referenced in (2) may 
be held to be less totalizing than the Edwardsian understanding of the 
concept. The kind of chief end referenced in (2) may be judged to be less 
totalizing than the Edwardsian understanding of a chief end because (2) 
does not commit one to the teaching that every act God performs regard-
ing humans in some way realizes, and never departs from, the chief end 
of divine-human loving union, and the subsidiary ways of human flour-
ishing connected thereto. What is required, rather, is a certain perspective 
on God’s primary motivation for creating and governing humans as well 
as one action-type that such a motivation precludes. Although less total-
izing than an Edwardsian chief end in that respect, the noted doctrine in 
(2) concerning God’s purposes obviously has implications for the kinds 
of endeavors God will take up and the actions He is willing to perform. 
Specifically, given the loving motives God adopts concerning the chief 
end for humans, God will not visit intentional-harm on humans.
Talk about exclusionary reasons and chief ends aside, the basic idea 
embedded within (2) should be clear enough. To suppose that the omnis-
cient God decides once and for all to create and guide humans principally 
motivated by His love is not a mere sentimental teaching. Rather, it is a 
teaching that offers a framework for thinking about divine action. In the 
present case, what is relevant is that the God who creates humans for the 
sake of love is committed never to inflict intentional-harm on humans, 
sinful or otherwise.
(3), it will be remembered, is the premise that if God never inflicts 
intentional-harm on any human, then God never punishes humans with 
strong-retribution. The premise is analytically true, once it is agreed that 
God’s inflicting of strong-retribution on humans entails that God inflicts 
intentional-harm on those punished, as discussed in the previous section. 
So, if the first portion of the premise regarding the visitation of divine 
intentional-harm is right, then it follows that God does not visit strong-ret-
ribution on humans. Thus, (3) appears to be true.
But if (3) is accepted, then, supposing one accepts the other premises 
as well, (4) follows. In that case, one should join Isaac in maintaining (in 
effect) that God does not punish humans with strong-retribution. God, 
as it were, has exclusionary reason not to consider punishing humans in 
ways that amount to intentional-harm (e.g., strong-retribution), given His 
primary creative and providential purposes. Alternatively put, because 
God’s chief end regarding the creation of humans is the achievement of 
their highest good, specifically loving union with Himself, God never 
punishes in ways that are diametrically opposed to the advancement of 
this chief end, as would be the case if God punished with strong-retri-
bution. For were God to adopt as His primary goal concerning humans 
the realization of their highest good, while simultaneously adopting the 
contradictory subsidiary goal of executing strong-retribution on sinful 
humans, God would be putting Himself at cross-purposes with Himself. 
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However, the perfectly intelligent God simply cannot be at cross-purposes 
with Himself by choosing subsidiary goals that frustrate His ultimate pur-
poses, provided that God is perfectly able to bring His primary and sub-
sidiary goals into alignment, which Isaac assumes is feasible for God.
III. The Anselmian Objection
However, not everyone shares with Isaac the assumption that God is able 
to punish in a manner that dovetails with God’s loving purposes. On the 
contrary, perhaps the most significant objection to the AGP comes from 
reliance on a kind of reasoning concerning divine retributive justice that, if 
sound, undermines this very assumption. The relevant kind of reasoning 
is often associated with Anselm of Canterbury, though it can be found in 
other influential Christian theologians as well.51 Adapted for our purposes, 
the reasoning can be stated as follows. Sin against the infinite and holy 
God accrues an infinite demerit, and God simply cannot overlook offenses 
to His honor. To do so would be to violate the fundamental demands of 
justice, something God cannot do. Hence if God is not otherwise compen-
sated, God simply must punish sinners in accordance with their demerit, at 
least when the offenses are particularly grievous. Provided that one main-
tains that God’s punishing of sinners as their demerit warrants sometimes 
amounts to a kind of divine strong-retribution (which is often assumed to 
be the case by proponents of such an argument), this form of reasoning 
contradicts the conclusion of the AGP.
Let us label this kind of reasoning that undergirds the conclusion that 
God must punish humans with strong-retribution for uncompensated 
sins the “Anselmian Paradigm.” Suppose that one accepts this paradigm, 
specifically the idea that God, unless He is otherwise compensated, must 
visit strong-retribution on humans for (significant) wrongdoing. This 
Anselmian understanding of the divine nature when paired with (1), or 
something like it, yields the following: God creates humans out of love, 
or with the provisional intention of acting consistently with love for them, 
yet God knows that He must punish humans who step out of line with 
strong-retribution. Since creation is generated from a place of love for 
humans, God, so to speak, always wants to be good to everyone, and all 
things being equal He would be, but God also knows that justice requires 
retribution of the kind that entails inflicting intentional-harm on some 
humans, specifically strong-retribution. On this Anselmian Paradigm, 
then, (1) is accepted (or something close to (1) is accepted), yet (2) is denied.
The most natural interpretation of the Anselmian Paradigm is one 
in which God’s disposition to punish is modally strong. Minimally, it 
seems, defenders of the paradigm should maintain, once (1) is adopted, 
that God must punish sinners as they deserve for particularly grievous 
51E.g., Cur Deus Homo I, chaps. 11–5, 20, 25. Cf. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian 
Religion, 2.16.1; and Jonathan Edwards, Original Sin I: II: III. See Eleonore Stump’s recent 
discussion of the plausibility and influence of such a mode of reasoning in Atonement, ch. 3.
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uncompensated sins in all but very distant worlds. For if God’s require-
ment to punish humans with strong-retribution is based upon some con-
tingent obstacle that might be removed with relative ease, then, given (1), 
God should remove it so that He can carry on with His loving purposes. 
But then (2) is not in danger of being contravened. In point of fact, more-
over, recent defenders of the teaching that God must punish humans with 
strong-retribution for uncompensated sins do apparently opt for some-
thing like this modally strong claim.52 For such reasons, we shall proceed 
on the assumption that the defender of the Anselmian Paradigm who also 
subscribes to (1) is best served by the noted strong modal claim, namely, 
that God must, in perhaps all but very distant worlds, punish humans 
with strong-retribution for uncompensated sins on account of His perfect 
justice.
Isaac does not display awareness of anything like the Anselmian 
Paradigm. This is not entirely surprising since Isaac lived before Anselm, 
and because this paradigm, or a precursor to it, seems to have had less 
influence on Isaac’s Eastern context.53 Nevertheless, Isaac’s descriptions 
of the divine character imply a firm rejection of the notion that God must 
visit strong-retribution on humans for uncompensated sins. Rather than 
requiring compensation, “To anyone who shows just a little suffering and 
will to compunction for what has occurred, to such a person immediately, 
at once, without any delay, [God] will grant forgiveness for their sins.”54 
More generally, it may be said that the Anselmian Paradigm is not just 
incompatible with many of Isaac’s theological commitments, but also 
considerably foreign to Isaac’s way of thinking. Nonetheless, considering 
how Isaac might respond to the Anselmian Paradigm will perhaps furnish 
52E.g., Corlett, “Divine Justice and Human Sin,” 133–145, and Crisp, “Divine Retribution,” 
35–52. A  notable reconfiguration of something akin to what I  am calling the Anselmian 
Paradigm, complete with a modally weaker claim about the conditions under which God 
might punish, is found in Richard Swinburne’s Responsibility and Atonement. There Swinburne 
argues that God need not punish sinners to the degree deserved for serious and uncom-
pensated transgressions, but that it would be inappropriate for God to forgive humans for 
serious sins without minimally requiring repentance and apology (see 148 and 181–182). 
But on Swinburne’s view it is good for the sinner for God to demand repentance and apol-
ogy (and perhaps penance), and, crucially, Swinburne does not advocate anything relevantly 
like divine strong-retribution (although his defended view of divine punishment might be 
said to have its own shortcomings). The upshot is that it is difficult to see how Swinburne’s 
modified Anselmian Paradigm provides special resources for a plausible objection to the 
AGP. Mutatis mutandis, a similar conclusion holds for more recent modifications of what 
might be recognized as broadly in keeping with the Anselmian Paradigm—e.g., William 
Craig’s Atonement and the Death of Christ, Stephen Porter’s “Swinburnian Atonement and 
the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” and Jada Twedt Strabbing’s “Divine Forgiveness and 
Reconciliation.” Since I do not know of a modified form of the Anselmian Paradigm (along 
with its modally weaker claim about divine punishment) that provides unique resources for 
a plausible objection to the AGP, I shall discuss modifications of the Anselmian Paradigm 
no further.
53Relevant here is Lossky, “Redemption and Deification,” 97–110.
54II/40, 14.
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the Isaac-inspired AGP with wider appeal—rather than merely leaving 
things to rest at a clash of competing paradigms. To that end, two lines of 
argumentation can be extrapolated from Isaac on behalf of the idea that 
God’s punitive justice is not relevantly inexorable and that God is some-
times free to forgive those who repent.
Consider, first, the manner in which Isaac appeals to the ministry of 
Christ on behalf of God’s forgiving nature.55 In response to the question, 
“Will God, if I ask Him, forgive me these things by which I am pained 
and by whose memory I am tormented, things by which, though I abhor 
them, I go on backsliding?,” Isaac points to God’s various acts of mercy, 
especially as that mercy is displayed by Christ. In Christ one finds that 
“the right hand of our Lord is stretched out night and day, while he is on 
the look out to support, comfort, and encourage everyone—especially to 
see if he can find any who endure even just a little suffering and grief so 
that their sins may be forgiven.”56 Stated in more general terms, Christ, 
possessing the full character of God, manifested a ministry of love to the 
point of being willing to die for his enemies, and he taught his follow-
ers to forgive freely those who repent (e.g., Matt. 18:21–35). Isaac in effect 
maintains that Christ’s presentation of freely-given forgiveness does not 
seem to fit well with the idea that God possesses a character of relevantly 
inexorable strong-retributive justice. Indeed, one might take things a step 
further and submit that Christ’s actions indicate that God sometimes for-
gives without any repentance. While being crucified, for example, Christ 
is famously depicted as saying, “Father, forgive them; for they do not 
know what they are doing” (Lk. 23:34).57 Whether or not this second step 
is warranted, we may draw from Isaac the insight that the way Christ for-
gives seems to stand in tension with the kind of inexorable divine punitive 
justice at issue.
A second response to the idea that God’s uncompensated punitive jus-
tice is inexorable comes from the manner in which Isaac attempts to elicit 
certain intuitions about God’s moral character.58 Isaac regularly argues 
from the lesser to the greater—specifically, from human moral goodness to 
divine moral goodness—to argue that God would not visit what I am call-
ing strong-retribution on anyone. Speaking of the disposition to exercise 
such retribution, for instance, he says, “We cannot even believe such a thing 
can be found in those human beings who live a virtuous and upright life 
and whose thoughts are entirely in accord with the divine will—let alone 
believe of God that He has done something out of retribution for anticipated 
55E.g., II/39, 15–16; and II/40, 14–16.
56II/40, 15–17.
57Biblical textual critics debate about whether Luke 23:34 belongs to the original gospel 
account (for a discussion, see Ehrman, Studies in the Textual Criticism of the New Testament, 
86–90), and theologians and philosophers debate about whether and when God’s forgiveness 
of humans is conditioned about repentance (see, e.g., Tombs, “The Offer of Forgiveness,” and 
Strabbing, “Divine Forgiveness and Reconciliation”).
58E.g., II/39, 15–16.
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evil acts in connection with those whose nature He has brought into being 
with honour and great love.”59 In place of such retributivist thinking, Isaac 
submits, we should conceive of God as akin to, only greater than, a loving 
Father, who always punishes for our benefit.60 It is easy to discern how one 
might utilize similar thinking in order to reject the relevant kind of inexo-
rable divine justice, although Isaac never does precisely that.
Most of us admire the individual who freely but judiciously forgives 
persons without requiring compensation. A  loving human father, for 
example, can forgive his prodigal son without requiring recompence. 
Similarly, a judge acting on behalf of the state can choose to pardon a con-
trite violator of the law or weaken the sentence given thereto. Mercies of 
these kinds are not unjust. So why maintain that a perfectly just Godṣmust 
exercise strong-retribution for uncompensated sins (even if something 
else may be required, such as penance)?61 This question is particularly 
acute when we add that the God who forgives the repentant also has the 
ability to bring restoration between the victim and victimizer.62
Against such reflections, J. Angelo Corlett, in a recent defense of the 
inexorability of something very much like divine strong-retribution, 
argues that the notion that God can forgive freely is fraught with problems.
If it is thought that God has no perfect or absolute duty to punish sin, then 
God is not obligated morally to punish anyone at all for any reason, leaving 
open the possibility that God would forgive sin either on a case by case basis 
for [reasons that] are her “own,” or even universally. However, this posi-
tion on divine justice encounters Plato’s Socrates’s Euthyphro problem [. . .], 
where divine justice might be changed with moral arbitrariness [. . .] what 
justifies God’s punishing in some case but not in others?63
The challenge, then, for those who postulate that God is free to forgive 
uncompensated sins is to provide one or more plausible principles that 
guide God’s decisions as to when to forgive without being compensated 
and when to punish.
Isaac has the conceptual resources to meet such a challenge, although 
he does not address it directly. To simplify things, let us leave aside con-
siderations where God’s decision concerning whether to forgive one 
individual might be taken to have positive or negative implications for 
others (which could be another means by which God acts non-arbitrarily 
on this issue). Instead, let us focus on the manner in which God’s choice 
of whether or not to forgive has implications for the wrongdoer. With that 
in mind, Isaac could say that, given that God has chosen to create humans 
for the sake of love, God always forgives freely (in part or whole), and 
59II/39, 2.
60II/39, 14–17, passim.
61For some biblical justification for appealing to human moral exemplars to understand 
God’s moral character, see Luke 11:11–13 (cf. Matt. 5:44–48; Eph. 5:1–2; Phil. 2:1–8; 1 Jn. 4:7–11).
62Helpful here is Talbott, “Punishment, Forgiveness, and Divine Justice,” 151–168.
63Corlett, “Divine Justice and Human Sin,” 138.
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thus forgoes punishment (in part or whole), when (and to the degree to 
which) He knows that doing so will be (or is likely to be) as good or bet-
ter for the wrongdoer than it would be should God choose not to forgive 
(in part or whole). Conversely, Isaac might say that God does not forgive 
freely when (and to the degree to which) He knows that doing so will be 
bad for the wrongdoer (e.g., increase the offender’s moral complacency). 
In such circumstances, maybe God punishes in remedial ways. Were God 
to operate in such a manner, it is plausible that God’s decisions would be 
guided by good moral reasons, and thus His decisions regarding when to 
forgive and when to punish (and to what degree) would not be arbitrary. 
Again, while Isaac does not exactly postulate such principles related to 
divine forgiveness, the point is that neither Isaac’s way of thinking nor the 
Isaac-inspired AGP obviously rests upon the kind of moral arbitrariness 
that Corlett would have us believe.64
The two Isaac-inspired responses I  have offered to the Anselmian 
Paradigm are both controversial and would require more develop-
ment than they can be given presently. Nevertheless, it seems that 
these responses minimally suggest that one may reasonably reject the 
Anselmian Paradigm. For those who are willing to reject this paradigm on 
the basis of such reasons, perhaps the most significant hurdle to  adhering 
to (2) has been removed. I submit, moreover, that the two responses to 
the Anselmian Paradigm, working in concert with (1),  provide indirect 
support for (2). But, clearly, if (2) is accepted alongside the other premises 
of the AGP, then (4) follows. In which case, one may affirm with Isaac that 
God does not punish humans with strong-retribution.
Conclusion
It might be said that a sufficient condition for a good argument is one in 
which an individual is justified in believing the conclusion of the argu-
ment on the basis of its premises. Whether the Isaac-inspired AGP meets 
that threshold is left to the reader’s judgement—some, for instance, will 
require greater attention to the details of Scripture. Whatever the judge-
ment, I hope I have shown that in Isaac rests the seeds of an argument 
for a significant conclusion that merits further discussion, namely, that 
God, because of His creative purposes guided by tremendous love, 
refuses to punish humans with the kind of retribution that amounts to 
intentional-harm.65
Lindsey Wilson College
64I trust that the reader is able to postulate additional divine action-guiding principles that 
are compatible with Isaac’s basic way of thinking and circumvent Corlett’s charge of moral 
arbitrariness.
65There are many to thank for assistance in the completion of this article. First, this article 
was partially constructed while I was a Resident Fellow with the John Templeton Foundation 
funded Creation Project at the Carl F. H. Henry Center for Theological Understanding, hosted 
by Trinity Evangelical Divinity School (TEDS) and directed by Thomas H. McCall. I am grateful 
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